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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

BABY YOU CAN DRIVE MY CAR: RETHINKING GREENHOUSE
GAS EMISSIONS PREEMPTION IN LIGHT OF MASSACHUSETTS
AND GREEN MOUNTAIN CHRYSLER

I. INTRODUCTION
Few things are as ubiquitous and necessary in modern American culture as
the automobile.1 It would seem unthinkable looking back over the past
hundred years that industrial advancement would reach a point where one car
would account globally for every ten people.2 This trend is even more striking
when we consider that as of 2002, North America’s car concentration
approaches forty-five cars for every one hundred people.3
Further alarming is the fact that while estimates vary, general scientific
consensus now recognizes that with increased motor vehicle usage comes
greater carbon dioxide emissions,4 a contributing factor significantly
responsible for the global warming phenomenon.5 This phenomenon should

1. SASI GROUP & MARK NEWMAN, PASSENGER CARS (2006) (“. . . [T]he car still defines a
lifestyle. Americans still buy cars by the millions, whether they are in gridlocked LA or in the
middle of Kansas miles from the nearest town.” (quoting Paul Harris)), available at
http://www.sasi.group.shef.ac.uk/worldmapper/posters/worldmapper_map31_ver5.pdf.
2. Id. (stating that as of 2002 there 590 million cars in the world, amounting to one for
every ten people).
3. Id.
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(2) (2000) (Congressional findings that “the growth in the
amount and complexity of air pollution brought about by urbanization, industrial development,
and the increasing use of motor vehicles, has resulted in mounting dangers to the public health
and welfare, including injury to agricultural crops and livestock, damage to and the deterioration
of property, and hazards to air and ground transportation.”). See also Massachusetts v. EPA, 549
U.S. 497, 523–27 (2007) (“Considering just emissions from the transportation sector, which
represent less than one-third of this country’s total carbon dioxide emissions, the United States
would still rank as the third-largest emitter of carbon dioxide in the world, outpaced only by the
European Union and China.”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation,
17 F.3d 521 (2d Cir. 1994); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295, 339 (D. Vt. 2007) (“. . . [T]he control and reduction of emissions of greenhouse
gases are critical to slow the effects of global warming, and that passenger vehicles and light-duty
trucks are responsible for some forty percent of the total greenhouse gas pollution in
[California].”).
5. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 504 (“A well-documented rise in global temperatures has
coincided with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere.
Respected scientists believe the two trends are related.”).
559

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

560

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII:559

cause further alarm considering the current prevalence and upward trend of
automobile usage in the United States.6
Increased awareness of the significant environmental, social, and economic
problems global warming poses for our nation has provided many states with
reason to take a more active role in limiting their own automobile Greenhouse
Gas (“GHG”) emissions.7 States seek this goal in a variety of ways, including
regulatory actions, litigation, and membership in regional GHG initiatives.8
California has been foremost among these states, and has long been considered
a leader in enacting aggressive environmental GHG regulations.9
In recent years, however, progress achieved by California and other states
has faced significant challenges. Automobile manufacturers have recently
brought multiple suits throughout the country alleging that state attempts at
automobile GHG emissions regulation are preempted by federal environmental
legislation.10 As such, California and other states’ progress will be illusory if
automobile manufacturers sway the courts to accept their federal preemption
challenges. Recent trial court decisions in California and Vermont, however,
seem to offer hope that these state regulatory actions can withstand challenges
of federal preemption.11 Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA,12 authoritatively recognizing global warming for the
first time as a pressing national problem,13 likely paves the way for future state
efforts to actively reduce their own GHG emissions.

6. See U.S. DEPT. OF TRANSPORTATION, RESEARCH AND INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY
ADMINISTRATION, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS Table 1-11 (2008) (showing an
increase in total highway registered vehicles between 2004 and 2006 from 243,010,549 to
250,851,833), available at http://www.bts.gov/publications/national_transportation_statistics/pdf/
entire.pdf.
7. See J. Jared Snyder, Global Warming Litigation: State and Citizens v. Federal
Government and Industry, 17 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 255, 255 (2006).
8. Id. at 255–56.
9. Richard Simon & Janet Wilson, EPA Denies California’s Right to Mandate Emissions,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 20, 2007) at 2 (stating that “California has frequently chartered the course the
country has followed” (quoting William K. Reilly)), available at http://www.latimes.com/news/
printededition/front/la-me-epa20dec20,1,6015795.story.
10. Of particular note for current discussion are the two recent district court cases coming
out of Vermont and California, Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508
F. Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007) and Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d
1151 (E.D. Cal. 2007). An additional suit, Lincoln-Dodge, Inc. v. Sullivan, 588 F. Supp. 2d 224
(D.R.I. 2008), was recently decided in Rhode Island.
11. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 295. See also Central Valley, 529 F.
Supp. 2d at 1151.
12. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
13. See Joshua Steinberg, Note, The Bone-Chilling Effects of Global Warming and the
EPA’s Cold-Shoulder Response to Pleas for Help, A Case Note on Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005), 26 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 169, 188 (2007).
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This note will first discuss the history and content of the Clean Air Act
(“CAA”), highlighting the broad and longstanding congressional deference
afforded to California to more strictly regulate GHG emissions. Next, the note
will discuss the Environmental Policy and Conservation Act (“EPCA”),
focusing on how—unlike the CAA—it expressly preempts any state from
enacting regulations “relating to fuel economy.”14 The note then briefly
describes California Assembly Bill 1493 (“AB 1493”), the formidable GHG
emissions legislation that has led many states to follow its path, and affected
current preemption litigation. The note will then move to explore recent
environmental jurisprudence that seeks to reconcile the seemingly conflicting
statutory mandates of the CAA and EPCA. The fact that virtually all means of
regulating GHG motor vehicle emissions relate, in some way, to fuel economy
make this conflict significant and readily apparent.15 Finally, the note will
argue that the recent decisions in Massachusetts, Green Mountain Chrysler,
and Central Valley Chrysler together represent a marked shift in how the
judicial branch views global warming, and have—at least initially—vindicated
the rights of states pushing for more stringent GHG emission standards. The
author adds that this note assumes the issuance of an EPA waiver for
California, as will be discussed below. The CAA preempts any state
enforcement of GHG emissions standards unless and until California receives
an EPA waiver for the standards they have promulgated.16
II. THE CLEAN AIR ACT—CALIFORNIA’S BROAD GRANT OF CONGRESSIONAL
AUTHORITY
In terms of U.S. environmental policy, the 1960s saw an unprecedented
national awareness of air pollution and focus on forming a national solution.17
Indeed, Congress’s 1963 passage of the CAA brought about a much more
expansive stance in addressing air pollution on a national scale.18 The CAA
vested authority in the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) to establish
standards for air pollutants emitted from new motor vehicles—pollutants that,
in the EPA’s judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution likely to endanger

14. See infra Section III.
15. See Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1158 (accepting as proven the proposition that
regulations requiring substantial reduction of carbon dioxide emissions will necessarily require
substantial increases in motor vehicle fuel efficiency).
16. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (2000).
17. Christopher T. Giovinazzo, Comment, California’s Global Warming Bill: Will Fuel
Economy Preemption Curb California’s Air Pollution Leadership?, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 893, 899
(2003).
18. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1164.
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public health or welfare.19 The EPA accomplishes this goal by establishing
national ambient air quality standards (“NAAQS”),20 which set the maximum
allowable discharge level for ambient air pollutants considered harmful to
public health or welfare.21 The plan also requires all states to submit a state
implementation plan (“SIP”) for EPA approval, highlighting how the state
plans to reduce or maintain the concentration of air pollution necessary in
order to meet current NAAQS.22
Section 209(a) of the CAA preempts all states from adopting automobile
emissions regulations, providing that “[n]o State or any political
subdivision . . . shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the
control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines
subject to this part.”23 It bears mentioning, however, that the original
enactment of the CAA contained no preemption provision,24 an absence that
reflects Congress’s understanding that air pollution regulation was a task
necessitating cooperative efforts from both the states and the federal
government.25
Section 209(a) preemption is qualified, however, by a waiver found in
subsection (b).26 A waiver may be granted by the EPA—provided certain
criteria are met—for “any state which has adopted standards . . . for the control
of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines prior to

19. Section 7521(a)(1) provides, in part, that “[t]he Administrator shall by regulation
prescribe (and from time to time revise) in accordance with the provisions of this Section,
standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles or new motor vehicle engines, which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air
pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”
20. § 7408(a)(1).
21. § 7408(a)(1)(A). See Deborah Keeth, The California Climate Law: A State’s CuttingEdge Efforts to Achieve Clean Air, 30 ECOLOGY L.Q. 715, 723 (2003).
22. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 17 F.3d 521, 525 (2d
Cir. 1994); Keeth, supra note 21, at 723.
23. § 7543(a). See also Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 526 (“The cornerstone of
Title II is Congress’ continued express preemption of state regulation of automobile emissions.”).
24. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 303
(D. Vt. 2007).
25. Id. at 303 n.6. See § 7401(a)(3)–(4) (“that air pollution prevention (that is, the reduction
or elimination, through any measures, of the amount of pollutants produced or created at the
source) and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of States and local
governments . . . that Federal financial assistance and leadership is essential for the development
of cooperative Federal, State, regional, and local programs to prevent and control air pollution.”).
See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 899 (“Through both the [Air Quality Act] and its successor
the Clean Air Act, the federal approach to air pollution control has maintained this high degree of
dependence on state cooperation, principally through reliance on state adoption and enforcement
of State Implementation Plans. . . .”).
26. § 7543(b).
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March 30, 1966.”27 Since only California had the foresight to regulate new
motor vehicle emissions prior to March 30, 1966, it is the only state entitled to
waiver consideration by the EPA.28 California’s long-standing commitment to
environmental regulation, coupled with the unique problems that GHG
emissions pose for the state’s climate, make that state an appropriate candidate
for waiver of federal preemption.29 Further, excepting California from general
preemption represents a compromise between the states’ traditional role in
regulating motor vehicle emissions and automobile manufacturers’ desire to
avoid the economic disruption that would likely result from having to meet
fifty-one separate sets of emissions control requirements.30
California thus holds a unique position as a regulatory leader among the
states,31 leading some to suggest that California’s role in environmental
regulation should be viewed not as an example of traditional cooperative
federalism, but rather as one of “modified federalism.”32 Under such a view
the federal government establishes an innovative connection with an individual
state rather than the states collectively, thus creating a relationship that fosters
enhanced innovation for that locality.33
To grant a waiver, the EPA must find that California’s standards are at
least as protective as existing federal standards “in the aggregate.”34 Further,
the EPA may only deny a California waiver application if the regulations
California seeks to adopt are “arbitrary and capricious,” if they are not needed

27. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 526 n.2 (citing § 7543(b)(1)).
28. Id. at 525.
29. See Keeth, supra note 21, at 723 (stating that congressional approval for the exception
was appropriate given California’s “unique problems” as well as their pioneering efforts to
control motor vehicle air pollution). See also Ann E. Carlson, Federalism, Preemption, and
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 281, 283 (2003) (stating that California’s
regulatory leadership has been responsible for catalytic converters, low-emission vehicles,
unleaded gasoline and other technologies); Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 900 (“Within this
cooperative approach to air pollution, no state was more instrumental to the formulation of
national air pollution policy than California.”).
30. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing
the debate “between the states, which wanted to preserve their traditional role in regulating motor
vehicles, and the manufacturers, which wanted to avoid the economic disruption latent in having
to meet fifty-one separate sets of emissions control requirements,” and emphasizing the
“compromise” that subsection (b) provided).
31. See Michael H. Wall, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California Assembly
Bill 1493: Filling the American Greenhouse Gas Regulation Void, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 567, 577
(2007) (characterizing California as a “figurehead of progressive environmental legislation . . .”).
32. See Carlson, supra note 29, at 284.
33. Id. at 285 (arguing that California’s special regulatory role has increased the states’
bureaucratic expertise in mobile source technology, has allowed for innovative policy proposals,
and has concentrated innovation geographically by promoting mobile source firms within
California).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000).
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to meet “compelling and extraordinary conditions,” or if the standards and
accompanying enforcement procedures the state employs are otherwise
inconsistent with section 7521(a) of the CAA.35 California’s satisfaction of
these three requirements obliges the EPA to grant their waiver request.36
Indeed the House Report accompanying the 1997 CAA amendments
demonstrates the wide discretion Congress intended to afford California
through this waiver:
The Administrator . . . is not to overturn California’s judgment lightly. Nor is
he to substitute his judgment for that of the State. There must be clear and
compelling evidence that the State acted unreasonably in evaluating the
relative risks of various pollutants in light of the air quality, topography,
photochemistry, and climate in that State, before [the] EPA may deny a
37
waiver.

Moreover, if such a deferential reading were in doubt, the Court’s recent
decision in Massachusetts lends more support for a finding that California
satisfies the “compelling and extraordinary conditions” waiver prong, leading
one analyst to say that:
[T]he global distribution of greenhouse gas emissions may present a novel
challenge to California’s ability to obtain a section 209(b) waiver. California’s
coastline is threatened by climate change in much the same way as that of
other states, precisely Massachusetts’ stated injury in Massachusetts v. EPA.
Uncertainty regarding the impact of climate change on weather events impedes
a determination that California, more than other states, will feel a
38
disproportionate burden due to greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles.

Subsequent CAA amendments further bolstered congressional support and
deference for California.39 To wit, the 1977 CAA amendments provided that
the EPA, when reviewing a California waiver application, must consider

35. Id. (“No such waiver shall be granted if the Administrator finds that—
(A) the determination of the State is arbitrary and capricious,
(B) such State does not need such State standards to meet compelling and extraordinary
conditions, or
(C) such State standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are not consistent
with section 7521(a) of this title.”).
36. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1171 (E.D. Cal.
2007).
37. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 302 (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1077, 1381).
38. Matthew Visick, If Not Now, When? The California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006: California’s Final Steps Toward Comprehensive Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Regulations,
13 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL L. & POL’Y 249, 266–67 (2007).
39. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 901 (“Congress reaffirmed its unique blessing upon
California through numerous amendments to the CAA.”).
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California’s standards “in the aggregate,”40 a change that provides California
increased flexibility by allowing the state to establish the protectiveness of
their proposed standards as a package rather than standard-by-standard.41
The very same amendments also brought the addition of section 177, a
provision allowing other states to adopt California standards once California
receives a formal EPA waiver.42 This so called “piggyback” provision allows
other states to implement California’s standards if that state’s standards “are
identical to the California standards for which a waiver has been granted for
such model year.”43 In an effort to allay automobile industry timing fears, the
waiver further employs a lead time requirement, providing that other states
may adopt California’s identical standards for which a waiver has been granted
if “California and such State adopt such standards at least two years before
commencement of such model year.”44 Presently seventeen states have
adopted California’s GHG motor vehicle emission standards by way of section
177.45 The aggregate effect of these states amounts to one third of the national
passenger vehicle market.46 Thus, the continuing vitality of California’s
standards has pressing significance not only for California but for numerous
other states and the country as a whole.
Finally, the history of California’s previous waiver requests demonstrates
the deferential position held by the state.47 California has made at least ninetyfive waiver requests under section 209(b), with about half involving new or

40. Id. at 902. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. N.Y. Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 17
F.3d 521, 525 (2d Cir. 1994).
41. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 902. See also Motor & Equipment Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA,
627 F.2d 1095, 1110–11 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The history of congressional consideration of the
California waiver provision, from its original enactment up through 1977, indicates that Congress
intended the State to continue and expand its pioneering efforts at adopting and enforcing motor
vehicle emission standards different from and in large measure more advanced than the
corresponding federal program; in short, to act as a kind of laboratory for innovation. Had
Congress wanted to limit California’s role to forbid its adoption of any program comparable to
the federal scheme in section 207, it could have easily done so. It did not. For a court to do so
despite the absence of such an indication would only frustrate the congressional intent.”).
42. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass’n, 17 F.3d at 525.
43. Id. (citing Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 129(b), 91 Stat.
685, 750 (1977)).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7507(2) (2008).
45. Justin R. Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts: An Overview of Current Litigation and
Common Legal Issues, GEO. ENVT’L. L. & POL’Y INST., 1, 15 (2006).
46. ARIZONA PIRG EDUCATION FUND, 2007 EPA WAIVER HEARING ON CALIFORNIA
STATE MOTOR VEHICLE POLLUTION CONTROL STANDARDS 2 (2007), available at
http://www.arizonapirg.org/uploads/2h/rH/2hrHlVnZ25HArXBuB6guJw/Background-On-CAsEPA-Waiver.pdf.
47. JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELZ, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: CALIFORNIA’S
WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR ACT, CRS-11-12
(2007), available at http://www.ncseonline.org/NLE/CRSreports/07Nov/RL34099.pdf.
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amended standards.48 Of all such requests, the EPA has granted all in whole or
in part.49 The EPA’s record of deference and the CAA amendments discussed
above, both evidence Congress’s declaration with letting California “blaze its
own trail.”50 In sum, the exemption California holds and other states’
leadership in regulating GHG emissions has resulted in many technological
advances,51 and California’s regulatory role has led other states to follow its
lead.52

48. Id.
49. Id. at CRS-12. See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (“In practice, California's
waiver applications are almost always approved.”).
50. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 903 (citing Ford Motor Co. v. EPA, 606 F.2d 1293, 1297
(D.C. Cir. 1979)).
51. See Carlson, supra note 29, at 283 (arguing that California's leadership regulating mobile
source pollution was responsible for numerous technological advancements, including the
catalytic converter, low-emission vehicles, and unleaded gasoline). See also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n
v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1090 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Given the indications before Congress that
California's regulatory proposals for nonroad sources were ahead of the EPA's development of its
own proposals and the Congressional history of permitting California to enjoy coordinate
regulatory authority over mobile sources with the EPA, the decision to identify California as the
lead state is comprehensible. California has served for almost 30 years as a “laboratory” for motor
vehicle regulation. . . . Its severe air pollution problems, diverse industrial and agricultural base,
and variety of climatic and geographical conditions suit it well for a similar role with respect to
nonroad sources.”); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295, 398 (D. Vt. 2007) (“Through amendments to the CAA, Congress has essentially designated
California as a proving ground for innovation in emissions control regulations.”).
52. At the time of this writing seventeen states have—or have publicly committed to—
enacting California’s more restrictive GHG emissions standards. The states include: Arizona
(Gov. Janet Napolitano, Exec. Order No. 2006-13, 12 Ariz. Admin. Reg. 3389–90 (Sept. 15–16),
available at http://www.azsos.gov/aar/2006/37/governor.pdf), Colorado (GOV. BILL RITTER, JR.,
COLORADO CLIMATE ACTION PLAN: A STRATEGY TO ADDRESS GLOBAL WARMING, (2007),
available at http://www.pewclimate.org/docUploads/COClimatePlan.pdf), Connecticut (2004
Conn. Acts 84, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2004/act/Pa/2004PA-00084-R00SB-00119PA.htm), Florida (Gov. Charlie Christ, Exec. Order 07-127, available at http://www.flclimate
change.us/ewebeditpro/items/O12F15074.pdf), Massachusetts (Press Release, Mass. Dep’t of
Envtl Protection, Massachusetts Enacts Strict New Vehicle Emissions Standards (Jan. 9, 2006),
available at http://www.cleancarscampaign.org/web-content/cleanairact/docs/Mass_Dept_of_
Env_Protection.pdf), Maine (Maine Dep’t of Envtl Protection, New Motor Vehicle Emission
Standards, 06-096 ME. CODE R. ch. 127, available at http://www.maine.gov/dep/air/regulations/
docs/chap127final.pdf), Maryland (Maryland Clean Cars Act of 2007, 2007 Md. Laws ch. 111
(passed as S.B. 103)), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2007RS/chapters_noln/Ch_111_
sb0103E.pdf), New Jersey (N.J. REV. STAT. § 26:2C-8.15–8.17 (2009)), New Mexico (Gov. Bill
Richardson, Exec. Order 2006-69, available at http://www.governor.state.nm.us/press/2006/dec/
122806_01.pdf), New York (Greenhouse Gas Exhaust Emissions Standards, N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 6, § 218-8 (2009), available at http://www.dec.ny.gov/regs/4243.html), Oregon
(Oregon Low Emission Vehicles, OR. ADMIN. R. § 340-257-0010 (2009), available at
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARs_300/OAR_340/340_257.html),
Pennsylvania
(Pennsylvania Clean Vehicles Program, 25 PA. CODE § 126.401 (2009), available at
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III. THE ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT—FEDERALLY
MANDATED FUEL ECONOMY STANDARDS AND EXPRESS PREEMPTION OF
REGULATIONS ‘RELATED TO FUEL ECONOMY’
Congress enacted the EPCA in 1975, as a comprehensive response to the
1973 energy crisis.53 Seeking to enhance the supply of fossil fuels through
increased production and energy conservation programs, the Act’s main thrust
involved the establishment of a system of mandatory corporate average fuel
economy (“CAFE”) standards.54 The EPCA empowers the Department of
Transportation (“DOT”) to set federal fuel economy standards for new fleets of
passenger automobiles,55 an authority the Secretary has delegated to the
National Highway Traffic Safety Administrator (“NHTSA”).56 CAFE
standards require any new automobile fleet to meet a minimum corporate
average fuel economy that must be set at the “maximum feasible average fuel
economy level.”57 In determining this level the NHTSA must consider (1)
technological feasibility; (2) economic practicability; (3) the effect of other
motor vehicle standards of the government on fuel economy; and (4) the need
of the United States to conserve energy.”58
Unlike the CAA, however, which provides California with the possibility
of a waiver of preemption, the EPCA expressly preempts all states from
attempting to regulate fuel economy.59
The EPCA preemption provision was adopted in order to maintain fuel
economy standards throughout the country.60 Specifically, the provision
provides:

http://www.pacode.com/secure/data/025/chapter126/subchapDtoc.html), Rhode Island (Rhode
Island’s Low Emission Vehicles Program, 12-031-037 R.I. CODE R. § 37.2.1 (2009), available at
http://www.dem.ri.gov/pubs/regs/regs/air/air37_07.pdf), Utah (Western Climate Initiative,
Statement of Regional Goal, tbl. 1 (Aug. 22, 2007), available at http://www.azclimate
change.gov/download/082207_statement.pdf), Vermont (12-031-001 VT. CODE R. § 5-1103(a)
(2009), available at http://www.anr.state.vt.us/air/docs/apcregs.pdf), and Washington (WASH.
REV. CODE § 70.120A.010 (2009), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=
70.120A.010). See also Wall, supra note 31 at 577; Carlson, supra note 29, at 302 (“The state’s
regulatory privileges carry weight beyond the state’s borders: any state with an approved state
implementation plan for a non-attainment area may adopt California motor vehicle standards.”).
53. General Motors Corp. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 166–67
(D.C. Cir. 1999).
54. Id. at 167. See Keeth, supra note 21, at 724–25.
55. 49 U.S.C. § 32902(a) (2000). See also Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529
F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
56. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1157 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1.5(f) (2008)).
57. § 32902(a).
58. § 32902(f). See also Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1157.
59. § 32919(a). See also Visick, supra note 38, at 268.
60. See Sara A. Colangelo, The Politics of Preemption: An Application of Preemption
Jurisprudence and Policy to California Assembly Bill 1493, 37 ENVTL. L. 175, 183 (2007)
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[W]hen an average fuel economy standard prescribed under the chapter is in
effect, a State or a political subdivision of a State may not adopt or enforce a
law or regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy
standards for automobiles covered by an average fuel economy standard under
61
this chapter.

It may come as no surprise that much recent and pending litigation in this
area seeks to address the issue of how we reconcile the EPCA’s express
preemption provision over regulations “related to fuel economy standards”
with the CAA’s long-standing commitment to allowing California the ability to
regulate GHG emissions at a level more stringent than the EPA, provided they
receive an EPA waiver.62 While the states’ ability to regulate mobile source
air pollution finds ample support within the CAA, only recently have courts
begun to grapple with the question of whether and to what extent California’s
CAA authority to regulate mobile source GHG emissions—and, resultantly,
other states’ ability to adopt the same—is consistent with EPCA’s express
waiver provision.63 However, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Massachusetts v. EPA,64 as well as district court decisions in Vermont and
California,65 all seem to provide considerable flexibility and support for
California to more stringently regulate GHG emissions—and for other states to
adopt the same regulations by way of the CAA piggyback provision.
IV. AB 1493: CALIFORNIA’S PROGRESSIVE GLOBAL WARMING LEGISLATION
Present litigation largely focuses on California AB 1493, a comprehensive
piece of legislation passed by the state in 2001 as a broad effort to reduce GHG
emissions from motor vehicles.66 Heralded for its scope, the legislation is
widely considered the most significant response to global warming at either the
federal or state level.67 Among its other purposes, AB 1493 requires the

(stating that the broad language of Section 32919 was employed by Congress to allay industry
concerns, thus preventing a “chaotic compliance regime of varying standards . . .”).
61. § 32919(a) (emphasis added).
62. Colangelo, supra note 60, at 183 (stating that AB 1493 preemption challenges under the
EPCA and the CAA illuminate the tension between not subjecting the automobile industry to fifty
different state standards and the congressional desire for California to continue its leadership as
the nation's laboratory for air pollution control technology).
63. Carlson, supra note 29, at 283 (“Despite the fact that California is exempted from the
CAA preemption provision codifying California's leadership in regulating mobile source air
pollution, it remains an open question whether the courts or the federal government will allow the
state to force technological changes designed to reduce mobile source greenhouse gas
emissions.”). See also Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 944.
64. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 558–59 (2007) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
66. Giovinazzo, supra note 17, at 895.
67. Id.
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California Air Resources Board (“CARB”) to “develop and adopt regulations
that achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of greenhouse
gas emissions from motor vehicles” no later than January 1, 2005.68 The GHG
emissions reductions CARB establishes must be “[c]apable of being
successfully accomplished within the time provided . . . taking into account
environmental, economic, social, and technological factors,”69 and must also
be “economical to an owner or operator of a vehicle.”70 In formulating these
standards, the CARB also considers the regulations’ impact on automobile
industry sales, jobs, and consumers.71 Although its economic analysis is
limited to the state of California, the CARB examines the very same factors
that the NHTSA observes in setting a CAFE standard.72
V. RESOLVING THE APPARENT PREEMPTION CONFLICT BETWEEN CAA AND
EPCA
It should be unsurprising that increased global warming awareness has also
led to an increase in global warming litigation during the 21st Century.73
Indeed, one analyst has explained that the increase in global warming litigation
reflects increased scientific evidence that global warming is a serious
multifaceted problem, a growing public awareness of the global warming
issue, and the tendency of public interest groups to enlist the courts as a tool
for resolution of public controversies.74 And while the Supreme Court’s recent
Massachusetts decision did not specifically address the question of
preemption, its recognition of the gravity posed by climate change, as well as

68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (West 2003).
69. § 43018.5(i)(2)(A).
70. § 43018.5(i)(2)(B).
71. § 43018.5(c)(2) (“Consider the impact the regulations may have on the economy of the
state, including, but not limited to, all of the following areas:
(A) The creation of jobs within the state.
(B) The creation of new businesses or the elimination of existing businesses within the
state.
(C) The expansion of businesses currently doing business within the state.
(D) The ability of businesses in the state to compete with businesses in other states.
(E) The ability of the state to maintain and attract businesses in communities with the
most significant exposure to air contaminants, localized air contaminants, or both,
including, but not limited to, communities with minority populations or low-income
populations, or both.
(F) The automobile workers and affiliated businesses in the state.”).
See also Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295,
337 (D. Vt. 2007).
72. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 338.
73. Pidot, supra note 45, at 1.
74. Id.
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the Court’s analysis of the interplay between the CAA and EPCA, has
persuaded federal district courts recently addressing the preemption question.75
A.

Massachusetts v. EPA—Overlapping Statutory Mandates not Mutually
Exclusive

Massachusetts v. EPA was brought by a group of citizens, states, and local
governments, alleging that in light of well-documented evidence of global
warming, the EPA had abdicated its responsibility under the CAA by refusing
to regulate greenhouse gases including carbon dioxide.76 Alternatively, the
EPA contended that it lacked authority under the CAA to regulate greenhouse
gases.77 A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit held that the EPA had properly
exercised its discretion, while lacking agreement as to whether the parties had
standing.78 Judge Randolph’s opinion found that the EPA’s substantial
discretion, as well as the many policy considerations the agency must consider
in reaching a non-regulatory decision, both supported a finding that the EPA
properly exercised its discretion.79
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of whether the EPA
had authority to regulate GHG emissions from new motor vehicles under
section 202(a)(1) of the CAA, and further, whether the EPA may refuse to
issue such standards based on policy considerations.80 As a threshold matter,
the Court found that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge EPA’s failure to
regulate.81 Article III standing requires a plaintiff to establish (1) “injury in
fact”—an invasion of a legally protected concrete and particularized interest,
(2) a causal connection between the injury and the complained of conduct, and
(3) it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.82 The Court found that the harms associated
with climate change are recognized and serious,83 and the fact that climate

75. See Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 309–10. See also Central Valley
Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1165–66 (E.D. Cal. 2007).
76. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
77. Id. at 1450.
78. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 415
F.3d 50, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
79. Id. But see Massachusetts, 415 F.3d at 67–73 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (arguing that EPA
ignored the plain statutory language of the CAA without explanation, which defined “air
pollutant” so broadly as to include “any air pollution agent or combination of such agents,
including any physical, chemical, biological, radioactive . . . substance or matter which is emitted
into or otherwise enters the ambient air”. . . citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2000)).
80. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 308.
81. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 525–27.
82. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
83. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 521 (“Indeed, the NRC Report itself—which EPA regards as
an ‘objective and independent assessment of the relevant science,’—identifies a number of
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concerns are “widely shared” did not minimize Massachusetts’ interest for
purposes of standing.84
While the EPA urged that the relief sought by petitioners would not
realistically mitigate global climate change,85 the Court instead found that
regulatory challenges should not be dismissed solely because they work
incrementally,86 stressing instead that “agencies, like legislatures, do not
generally resolve massive problems in one fell regulatory swoop . . . [but]
instead whittle away at them over time, refining their preferred approach as
circumstances change and as they develop a more-nuanced understanding of
how best to proceed.”87 Thus, that a regulatory action might be a tentative first
step did not mean it lacked redressability.88 In sum, the Court held that a
plaintiff need not show that a favorable decision will relieve every injury, but
only that it would relieve some discrete injury to himself.89
On the merits, the Court had little trouble finding that the EPA did not lack
the authority to regulate carbon dioxide emissions,90 noting instead that the
CAA’s sweeping definition of “any air pollution agent” foreclosed the EPA’s
narrow reading of their regulatory authority.91 Rather, the expansive definition
of “air pollutant” that included “any air pollution agent or combination of such
agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air”92 on its face embraced any

environmental changes that have already inflicted significant harms, including ‘the global retreat
of mountain glaciers, reduction in snow-cover extent, the earlier spring melting of rivers and
lakes, [and] the accelerated rate of rise of sea levels during the 20th century relative to the past
few thousand years. . . .’”).
84. Id. at 522 (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Atkins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998)).
85. Id. at 524 (“EPA overstates its case.”).
86. Id. (stating that acceptance of such a premise would doom most challenges to regulatory
action).
87. Id. at 525 (“While it may be true that regulating motor-vehicle emissions will not by
itself reverse global warming, it by no means follows that we lack jurisdiction to decide whether
EPA has a duty to take steps to slow or reduce it.”).
88. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 523–25.
89. Id. at 525–26 (“Because of the enormity of the potential consequences associated with
man-made climate change, the fact that the effectiveness of a remedy might be delayed during the
(relatively short) time it takes for a new motor-vehicle fleet to replace an older one is essentially
irrelevant. Nor is it dispositive that developing countries such as China and India are poised to
increase greenhouse gas emissions substantially over the next century: A reduction in domestic
emissions would slow the pace of global emissions increases, no matter what happens
elsewhere.”).
90. Id. at 528.
91. Id. at 528–29.
92. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7606(g) (2000)).
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type of airborne compound, and further underscored congressional intent
through repeated use of the word “any.”93
The Court was likewise not persuaded by the EPA’s argument that it could
not regulate motor vehicle carbon dioxide emissions because doing so would
require them to tighten mileage requirements, a statutory mandate the EPA
claimed was congressionally assigned to the DOT.94 That the DOT sets
mileage standards, the Court maintained, in no way allowed the EPA to “shirk
its environmental responsibilities.”95 Instead, the EPA’s charge to “protect[]
the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare,’”96 and the DOT’s directive to promote
energy efficiency,97 imposed alternative statutory mandates.98 Even though the
two statutory obligations could at times overlap, that mere possibility, the
Court found, did not mean the two agencies could not mutually administer
their obligations.99
The Court similarly addressed the alternative issue of whether, even after
establishing statutory authority under the CAA, the EPA could still conclude
that GHG emissions regulation would be unwise. The Court found such a
conclusion at odds with the statutory text of the CAA,100 which provided that
once the EPA has responded to a rulemaking petition, it may avoid taking
further action only by determining that greenhouse gases do not contribute to
climate change, or by providing some reasonable explanation for not
exercising its discretion.101 Since the EPA offered nothing more than a
“laundry list of reasons not to regulate,”102 the Court found that it had refused
to comply with its clear statutory command.103
The Court’s pronouncement in Massachusetts was generally regarded as a
substantial victory for environmental advocates, and has been recognized as
one of the most important environmental decisions in many years.104 Whether

93. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529 n.25 (citing Dept. of Hous. and Urban Dev. v. Rucker,
535 U.S. 125, 131 (2002)).
94. Id. at 530–32.
95. Id. at 532.
96. Id. (citing § 7521(a)(1)).
97. Id. (citing § 6201(5)).
98. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
99. Id. (“EPA has been charged with protecting the public’s ‘health’ and ‘welfare’ . . . a
statutory obligation wholly independent of DOT’s mandate to promote energy efficiency.”).
100. Id. (“The alternative basis for EPA’s decision—that even if it does have statutory
authority to regulate greenhouse gases, it would be unwise to do so at this time—rests on
reasoning divorced from the statutory text.”).
101. Id. at 533 (“. . . [T]he use of the word ‘judgment’ is not a roving license to ignore the
statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise discretion within defined statutory limits.”).
102. Id.
103. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–55.
104. Linda Greenhouse, Justices Say EPA Has Power to Act on Harmful Gases, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 3, 2007.
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the EPA promptly decides to regulate GHG emissions under the CAA—an
unlikely scenario—the decision nonetheless has created a common sense
discourse regarding global warming.105 Further, in light of California’s
pending waiver request, commentators viewed the Court’s ruling as also
placing the state’s request on much firmer ground.106
While Massachusetts involved the issue of the EPA’s discretion under the
CAA rather than federal preemption concerns, the Court’s analysis regarding
the relationship between the CAA and the EPCA has been influential to lower
courts addressing questions of federal preemption under the EPCA.
B.

Green Mountain Chrysler—Judicial Restraint and Separation of Powers

Green Mountain Chrysler was brought by various automotive
manufacturers’ groups seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against
Vermont’s GHG regulations establishing new automobile emissions
limitations.107 The plaintiffs asserted that Vermont’s regulations were
expressly and implicitly preempted both under the EPCA108 and the CAA,109
presenting the district court with a question of first impression involving the
degree of interplay between these two expansive federal environmental
statutes.110 Chief Judge William Sessions authored the court’s opinion.111
At issue in Green Mountain Chrysler was a comprehensive set of GHG
emissions regulations adopted by California in 2004,112 which applied to largevolume motor vehicle manufacturers beginning in 2009, and intermediate and
small manufacturers in 2016.113 The regulations required decreasing limits for
manufacturers’ fleet average emissions, expressed in terms of grams of carbon
dioxide equivalent per mile (gpm).114 While the regulations did not set fuel
economy standards, they did—like EPCA fuel economy standards—measure
carbon dioxide emissions.115 California applied for an EPA waiver for these
regulations in 2005, but EPA’s determination had not yet been made prior to

105. Erica L. Rancilio, Recent Development, Massachusetts v. EPA, 21 TUL. ENVTL. L.J.
171, 176 (2007).
106. MCCARTHY & MELZ, supra note 47, at CRS-14.
107. Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 300
(D. Vt. 2007).
108. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 32901–32919 (2000).
109. §§ 7401–7671.
110. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
111. Id. at 299.
112. Id. at 302.
113. Id. at 341.
114. Id. at 342 (“For example, the PC/LDT1 category permits new vehicles to emit a fleet
average of 323 gpm in model year 2009, decreasing to 205 gpm in model year 2016. The LDT2
category permits a fleet average emission of 439 gpm in 2009, decreasing to 332 gpm in 2016.”).
115. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 342
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litigation.116 Vermont subsequently adopted California’s 2004 regulations
pursuant to the CAA section 177 piggyback provision117 as it has been doing
since 1996.118
From the outset Chief Judge Sessions emphasized that the preemption
doctrines did not apply,119 instead framing the case in response to the
Massachusetts decision.120 Where the Supreme Court in Massachusetts found
overlap but no conflict between the EPA’s authority to regulate greenhouse
gases and NHTSA’s authority under the EPCA to promote energy efficiency
by setting mileage standards, the question in Green Mountain Chrysler asked
whether the EPA’s authority to issue a waiver for California standards under
section 209(b) presented the same “overlap without conflict” scenario.121
Resolution of this question, the court said, depended on an analysis of
congressional intent.122
As to congressional intent, the court found no evidence to indicate that the
GHG emissions standards were so closely related with fuel economy standards
as to be expressly preempted.123 Congress likewise did not intend for the
EPCA’s CAFE standards to exclusively occupy the field of fuel economy,
since the NHTSA must take into consideration “other federal standards which
may affect fuel economy.”124
Although concluding that the preemption doctrine did not apply, the court
nevertheless conducted federal preemption analysis,125 both because the
EPCA’s preemption provision appeared literally to forbid enactment of
Vermont’s regulations, and because their regulations were alleged to actually
conflict with the EPCA’s fuel economy standards.126

116. Id. at 302.
117. Id. at 302 n.5 (“Connecticut, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Washington, in addition to Vermont, have adopted
California's standards for GHG emissions, pursuant to § 7507.”).
118. Id. at 338 (“Vermont first adopted California emissions standards for new motor vehicles
regulations pursuant to § 177 of the CAA in 1996, when it adopted the LEV program. Vermont
adopted California's LEV program because motor vehicles for much of Vermont's air pollution,
and the California standards required greater pollution reductions than the federal standards.
Vermont has amended the LEV regulations several times in order to remain consistent with
California's standards.”).
119. Id. at 343–44 (citing United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 198 (1939)) (“The
Supremacy Clause is not implicated when federal laws conflict or appear to conflict with one
another. In such a case courts have a duty to give effect to both provisions, if possible.”).
120. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 344.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing N.Y. Tel. Co. v. N.Y. State Dept. of Labor, 440 U.S. 519, 540 (1979)).
123. Id. at 354.
124. Id.
125. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 350.
126. Id.
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Speaking first to conflict preemption, the court was not persuaded that
plaintiffs had met their burden of proving that the GHG regulations were
“sufficiently draconian” as to “essentially usurp NHTSA’s prerogative to set
fuel economy standards.”127 Rather, congressional intent evidenced in multiple
CAA amendments had been to designate California as a proving ground for
innovative regulations, more often than not over objections from the
automobile industry.128 To be sure, the court conceded that the regulations
presented substantial challenges.129 The court was unconvinced, however, that
automakers could not meet these challenges, considering the EPA’s authority
and flexibility to address lead time through the waiver process, as well as the
industry’s history of compliance with previous technological challenges.130
In light of the historical tradition of providing the states with primary
responsibility over mobile source air pollution regulation,131 the court found
that the EPCA’s preemption provision may not invalidate Vermont’s
regulations absent clear and manifest congressional purpose to do so.132 In
rejecting plaintiffs’ argument that Vermont’s regulation merely represented a
“de facto fuel economy standard,” the court instead found that the regulations
comprised much more than a “requirement to improve fuel economy, cloaked
in the rhetoric of reducing carbon dioxide emissions.”133 While there was
undoubtedly a mathematical relationship between the carbon content of fuel
and the carbon released, Vermont’s regulations also measure carbon dioxide
equivalents134 so as to “cover greenhouse gases other than carbon dioxide.”135
Thus, the inclusion of emissions that do not correlate with fuel economy

127. Id. at 398.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 399
130. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 399. (“. . . [A]utomakers describe
intensive efforts to develop and utilize new technologies to increase fuel efficiency and reduce
emissions. American automakers are in the vanguard of utilizing hybrid technology to
dramatically improve fuel economy. Clean diesel technology is being offered in a growing
number of vehicles. Dramatic improvements to powertrain technologies are under study and may
be available in the not-too-distant future. Alternative fuels such as ethanol provide another
strategy for reducing GHG emissions. The manufacturers have become fully engaged in
developing these technologies to address emissions concerns, and those efforts are front-andcenter in the public record. History suggests that the ingenuity of the industry, once put in gear,
responds admirably to most technological challenges.”).
131. Id. at 350 (“. . . Congress acknowledged that the regulation of air pollution from mobile
sources was traditionally a state responsibility.”).
132. Id. at 351 (Congressional purpose is the “ultimate touchstone” of preemption analysis.).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 352 (Vermont’s regulation defines “carbon dioxide equivalents” to include
methane, carbon monoxide and nitrous oxide.).
135. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 352.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

576

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XXVIII:559

foreclosed plaintiffs’ assertion that the GHG regulation was nothing more than
a fuel economy standard.136
The court was likewise worried about construing an already broad
statutory preemption provision in a way that would—for all practical
purposes—eliminate the presumption against preemption.137 The court found
congressional intent instructive on this point in that while the EPCA’s
objective was undoubtedly to improve automotive efficiency by setting
uniform fuel economy standards, the legislation was equally drafted against the
backdrop of other regulations affecting emissions standards, namely the
CAA.138 The general language of the preemption clause then, when combined
with an absence of any congressional intent as to its limits—and the specific
requirement that the EPA take California emissions regulations into
consideration—all tipped in favor of Congress not clearly intending to preempt
the Vermont regulations.139 Indeed, this conclusion was even more justified
because the state regulation being challenged involved the traditional exercise
of state police power.140
Many commentators regarded the Green Mountain Chrysler decision as a
significant victory for states taking an active role in the fight against global
warming,141 leading some analysts to call the decision “[i]ndisputably . . . a
major judicial pronouncement on the subject of climate change, and one of the
most important, recent environmental law decisions generally.”142
Additionally, since Green Mountain Chrysler was the first decision to validate
adoption of the California standards, the result is greatly significant for the
numerous other states that have also adopted the state’s standards by way of
section 177.143

136. Id.
137. Id. at 353 (“[I]f ‘relate to’ were taken to extend to the furthest reach of its indeterminacy,
then for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course,” and this would “read the
presumption against pre-emption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with
generality.” (citing Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995))).
138. Id. at 354.
139. Id.
140. Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 356.
141. Tony Perriello & Carolyn Whetzel, Mobile Sources: Court Backs Vermont Emissions
Rules Against Challenge Brought by Auto Industry, BNA ENVIRONMENT REPORTER (Sept. 14,
2007).
142. Richard M. Frank, In Depth: A Very Green Environmental Ruling, From the Green
State, ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS NETWORK (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://www.enn.com/
business/article/23485.
143. Gabrielle Sigel and Allison A. Sapsford, Federal Court Upholds California GHG
Emissions Standards for New Automobiles, JENNER & BLOCK: CLIMATE CHANGE UPDATE (Sept.
18, 2007) at 3, available at http://www.jenner.com/files/tbl_s20Publications%5CRelated
DocumentsPDFs1252%5C1829%5CFedCourtUpholdsCalGHG.pdf.
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Indeed, this importance is underscored by the fact that it led eighty-nine
congressional representatives to write to the EPA, asserting that the opinion
should guide the EPA’s pending waiver decision.144 The letter urged the EPA
to make its decision “on the merits, in accordance with the law and the facts of
this case, which demand you immediately grant California’s waiver, allowing
California and other states to move forward—ideally in partnership with the
federal government.”145
C. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone
Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, like Green Mountain Chrysler, was a
declaratory judgment action brought by the Association of International
Automobile Manufacturers (“AIAM”) seeking judicial pronouncement that the
EPCA preempts the CARB regulations that aim to reduce GHG emissions
from motor vehicles.146 The case was stayed in anticipation of the pending
Massachusetts and Green Mountain Chrysler decisions, and the parties
submitted supplemental briefings on the impact of those decisions on their
case.147
From the outset the court found that the implementation of regulations
requiring substantial reduction in carbon dioxide necessarily required
substantial increases in motor vehicle fuel efficiency.148 However, AB 1493
regulations also provided offsets in the computation of carbon dioxide
emissions for air conditioner improvements and for the ability of vehicles to
run on alternative fuel formulations that provide lower net carbon emissions.149
Thus, the court concluded that compliance with California’s AB 1493
regulations could be at least partially achieved through ways not directly
proportional to fuel economy mile-per-gallon improvements.150
The court moved to briefly summarize the Massachusetts and Green
Mountain Chrysler decisions in an effort to determine whether the decisions
represented a change in controlling law sufficient to allow reconsideration of
their prior holdings.151 The court found significant that the Supreme Court had
considered and rejected EPA’s argument in Massachusetts that carbon dioxide

144. Dustin Till, Court Upholds State’s Right to Regulate GHG Emissions from New Motor
Vehicles, MARTEN LAW GROUP ENVIRONMENTAL NEWS (Sept. 26, 2007), available at
http://www.martenlaw.com/news/?20070926-ghg-emissions.
145. Id.
146. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Goldstone, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1153–54 (E.D. Cal.
2007).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1158.
149. Id.
150. Id. (finding it undisputed that compliance with AB 1493 can be at least partially
accomplished through changes not directly reflected in mile-per-gallon fuel economy increases.).
151. See Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1162–65.
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regulation was impossible because it would require infringement of a task
delegated to the DOT under the EPCA—namely the tightening of mileage
standards.152 Further indicating the similarity of issues and significance
between the Massachusetts decision and the instant case, the court went on to
conclude that:
The court understands that the issue of preemption was not precisely before the
Supreme Court because the issues in that case pertained to the authority of one
agency of the federal government . . . to regulate carbon dioxide emissions
under the Clean Air Act to the possible detriment of [the] DOT’s aims and
goals in its administration of [the] EPCA’s CAFE standards program. While
the preemption doctrine does not apply to the interplay between two federal
schemes, the inquiry into the conflict between those schemes is similar to
preemption analysis because both preemption of state law and preclusion of
153
federal statutory remedies are questions of congressional intent.

In sum, the court found that Massachusetts represented a change in controlling
law adequate to allow reconsideration of their September Order.154
While finding no disagreement with the Green Mountain Chrysler
conclusion that the preemption doctrine did not apply to the interplay between
section 209(b) of the CAA and the EPCA, the court employed a somewhat
different analytical approach, instead starting its analysis with the interplay
between the regulatory functions of the CAA and the EPCA’s mileage-setting
authority.155 This three part analysis involved first asking whether the EPA
may promulgate emission control regulations having an effect on fuel
economy, further asking whether the EPCA precludes any new EPApromulgated regulations that would have the incidental effect of requiring
greater fuel efficiency, and finally, by answering whether there is any basis for
treating a regulation granted by state waiver any differently than a regulation
otherwise promulgated by the EPA.156
On the first inquiry, the court found that Massachusetts directed their
threshold inquiry not at the likelihood that California standards would interfere
with the EPCA’s regulatory scheme, but rather, on the scope of the EPCA’s
ability to bar regulations aimed at public health and welfare where the
regulations impact mileage standards.157 Massachusetts was illustrative on this
point.158 The fact that the CAA specifically mandated that EPA protect the

152. Id. at 1163.
153. Id. at 1164 (internal citations omitted).
154. Id. at 1164–65.
155. Id. at 1165.
156. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
157. Id. at 1166.
158. Id. at 1167 (“The Supreme Court’s strong statement of EPA’s authority to regulate
carbon dioxide emissions informs this court’s conclusion that Congress intended EPA to be able
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public health and welfare while the EPCA did not do the same for the DOT,
indicated that Congress empowered the EPA to enact GHG controls despite an
impact on fuel efficiency.159
Finding support for overlapping statutory obligations, the court moved to
address the question of what mechanism should resolve inconsistencies
between the two regulatory schemes.160 While the AIAM maintained that the
EPA must assure harmonization with the DOT of any new regulations that
impinge on existing CAFE standards, the court found no support in the
statutory language of the CAA for such a position.161 Examination of the
structure and text of the EPCA and CAA instead evidenced Congress’s intent
to allocate the EPA with the broader authority—that of regulating vehicle
emissions involving the important purpose of insuring public health and
welfare.162 The fact that the EPA must evaluate the risk motor vehicle
greenhouse gases pose on public health and welfare—and the mandate to
regulate, if such endangerment is found—further bolstered this reading.163
The EPCA’s language also supported this conclusion.164 When
establishing CAFE standards the Secretary of Transportation must consider
“technological feasibility, economic practicability, the effect of other motor
vehicle standards of the Government on fuel economy, and the need of the
United States to conserve energy.”165 The CAA, alternatively, gives the EPA
no corresponding statutory duty to give consideration to the EPCA’s regulatory
scheme.166 The court found this asymmetrical allocation indicative of
congressional intent that the DOT, through the NHTSA, must conform its
CAFE program to the EPA’s determination of what regulatory level is
necessary to protect public health and welfare.167
If any doubt still lingered, the court further noted how the factors the EPA
must consider in discharging their duty overlap with the factors the NHTSA
must consider in discharging theirs.168 In preparing emissions reductions, the
EPA is instructed to “give appropriate consideration” to factors including the
achievable level of emissions reductions through available cost, energy, and

to promulgate emissions control regulations for the protection of public health and welfare
notwithstanding the potential effect of those regulations on average fleet fuel economy standards
determined under EPCA.”).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
162. Id.
163. Id. (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 530–31 (2007)).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1176 (emphasis added) (citing 49 U.S.C. § 32902(f) (2000)).
166. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1168.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1169.
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safety factors associated with the application of the emissions reduction
technology.169 The comparable EPCA language, again, requires instead that
the Secretary “shall consider. . . .”170 The court read this to indicate that while
Congress did not empower the NHTSA to consider the impact mileage
standards would have on public health and welfare, they did empower the
NHTSA to consider “other motor vehicle standards of the government,”171
enabling the NHTSA to conform their mileage standards with the reduction the
EPA finds necessary for the protection of public health and welfare.172 The
court found any other conclusion nonsensical, finding instead that:
Given the level of impairment of human health and welfare that current climate
science indicates may occur if human-generated greenhouse gas emissions
continue unabated, it would be the very definition of folly if [the] EPA were
precluded from action simply because the level of decrease in greenhouse gas
173
output is incompatible with existing mileage standards under EPCA.

Lastly, the court considered the status of state regulations granted an EPA
waiver.174 Given the conclusion that the EPA may promulgate conflicting
regulations so long as they are directed at public health and welfare, the court
framed the issue as whether a state regulation granted a CAA waiver should
stand in any different stead with respect to inconsistencies it may have with the
EPCA fuel efficiency standards.175 As previously indicated, the EPA is
obliged to grant a waiver application for California regulations if the
regulations meet the three requirements contained under section 209.176
California regulations that have been granted an EPA waiver additionally serve
as “other laws of the Government” that must be considered by the NHTSA in
formulating the EPCA average fleet mileage standards.177 In Central Valley,
however, AIAM contended that the extent of consideration the NHTSA must
give to California’s regulations amounted only to a determination that it has a
de minimis effect on fuel efficiency.178 If the NHTSA found that the California
regulations had more than a de minimis effect on fuel efficiency, they argued
that the regulation should be preempted.179

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id at 1171 (citing § 7521(a)(3)(A)(i)).
Id. at 1168 (emphasis added).
Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.
Id.
Id. at 1170.
Id.
Id. at 1171.
Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1171.
Id. at 1169.
Id. at 1172.
Id.
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The court found Green Mountain Chrysler convincing on this issue, calling
it “[t]he most thorough and persuasive analysis of the issue so far as the court
has found.”180 There the court looked to the EPCA section 502(d), which
provided that any manufacturer could apply to the DOT for modification of a
CAFE standard if it could show the existence of a “federal standards fuel
economy reduction,” defined as including the EPA-approved California
emissions standards.181 The court in Central Valley found this language
persuasive to indicate that when the EPCA was adopted in 1975, Congress
“unequivocally stated that federal standards included EPA-approved California
emissions standards.”182 Additionally, as discussed in Green Mountain
Chrysler, the EPCA’s legislative history supports the conclusion that
regulations promulgated by California and granted waiver status under section
209 are “other motor vehicle standards” that the NHTSA must consider in
setting fuel economy standards.183 In sum, Central Valley held that just as in
Massachusetts, where the EPA’s CAA duty to regulate GHG emissions
overlapped with but did not conflict with the DOT’s duty to set fuel efficiency
standards. Likewise California’s AB 1493 efforts to regulate GHG emissions
through the CAA waiver overlap, but do not conflict with the DOT’s
responsibility under the EPCA.184
The Central Valley decision was regarded by commentators as further
judicial affirmation in favor of state regulation, representing a “judicial
recognition of global warming as more than just a political issue.”185
VI. ANALYSIS—A MARKED SHIFT IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF THE GLOBAL
WARMING ISSUE
At a fundamental level, Massachusetts has been regarded by commentators
as helping to create a common-sense discourse about global warming.186
Indeed, some have opined that the Court’s decision will have the effect of
requiring an Executive Branch, specifically the Bush administration, that has
repeatedly denied a causal connection between human activity and global
warming to abandon its unilateral position.187 Others have further argued that
the Court’s decision has the significance of vindicating “the individuals,

180. Id.
181. Central Valley, 529 F. Supp. 2d at 1172–73 (citing Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth
Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d 295, 346 (D. Vt. 2007)).
182. Id. at 1173.
183. Id. (quoting Green Mountain Chrysler, 508 F. Supp. 2d at 345).
184. Id. at 1174.
185. Cheryl Miller, Federal Ruling Boosts California’s Efforts to Curb Auto Emissions, THE
RECORDER (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1197496455518.
186. Rancilio, supra note 105, at 177.
187. Id. at 177–78.
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industries, organizations, and state and local governments that have been
pushing for global warming regulation all along.”188
Yet, while these conclusions are certainly true, the Massachusetts decision
also seems to reflect an interpretive shift by the Court, and one that has the
potential for more hospitable judicial assessment of future preemption
challenges. While the Court has previously utilized an analysis looking solely
to the plain meaning of statutory language to decipher congressional intent,
Massachusetts appears to shift the emphasis instead to the purpose behind
regulatory enactments. By looking instead to the legislative history and
purpose behind environmental legislation such as the CAA and EPCA, state
attempts such as those at issue in Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley
arguably stand a better chance of success on appeal.
A.

Reconsidering Engine Manufacturers and “Plain Meaning” as
Dispositive of Congressional Intent

Perhaps analogy provides the most apt way to demonstrate this seeming
judicial shift from plain meaning to more thorough statutory analysis (and
more hospitable view of state regulatory attempts). Prior to the Supreme
Court’s Massachusetts decision, its last foray into CAA preemption was in
Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Quality Management.
District.189 In Engine Manufacturers, the Court, in an opinion authored by
Justice Scalia, held that California fleet rules prohibiting the purchase of
vehicles not meeting stringent emissions standards were preempted under the
CAA.190 At issue was the scope of the word “standard” in section 209(a) of
the CAA, which provides that: “[n]o [s]tate or any political subdivision thereof
shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of
emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to
this part.”191 The district court granted summary judgment for South Coast,
holding that the fleet rules were not “standards” within the meaning of section
209(a), because they regulated only the purchase of vehicles otherwise
available for sale in California.192 Where fleet rules did not compel
manufacturers to meet a new emissions limit, but rather affected the purchase
of vehicles, the district court held that such a regulation was not a
“standard.”193

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

Id. at 178.
Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246 (2004)
Id. at 258.
42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000).
Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 251.
Id. at 251–52.
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The Supreme Court instead found that the preemptive effect of section
209(a) was not limited to sales restrictions.194 Justice Scalia began by finding
that the ordinary meaning of congressional language normally expresses
legislative purpose.195 Looking to Webster’s Second New International
Dictionary, Justice Scalia defined “standard” as “that which is established by
authority, custom, or general consent, as a model or example; criterion;
test.”196 Applying this definition to section 209(a), the majority found that the
criteria referred to in section 209 related to the emission characteristics of a
vehicle, an interpretation consistent with the use of “standard” throughout the
CAA.197
Similarly, the majority found that the district court’s distinction between
purchase restrictions and sale restrictions confused standards with the means
for enforcing standards.198 Section 202 of the CAA, the Court found, set a
standard, where later sections 203–206 provided methods to enforce such a
standard.199 Use of the term in other portions of the CAA thus demonstrated
that Congress contemplated the enforcement of emission standards through
purchase requirements.200 The Court again found support for this reading
through the use of the word “standard” in another portion of the CAA.201
Indeed, section 246 of the CAA required state-adopted and federally-approved
“restrictions on the purchase of fleet vehicles to meet clean-air standards.”202
From this statutory analysis the Court concluded that Congress contemplated
emissions standard enforcement through purchase requirements.203
Finally, the majority maintained that allowing purchase restrictions would
in effect undermine and undo the carefully calibrated regulatory scheme
envisioned by Congress,204 reasoning that although the fleet rules covered only
certain purchasers (and thus do not eliminate all demand for covered vehicles),
allowing one state to enact rules would lead others to do the same.205 In
declining to read into section 209(a) a purchase/sale distinction absent from the
text or structure of the CAA, the Court found that “[a] command, accompanied
by sanctions, that certain purchasers may buy only vehicles with particular

194. Id. at 253.
195. Id. at 252.
196. Id. at 252–53 (citing WEBSTER’S SECOND NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2455
(1945) (internal citations omitted)).
197. Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 253.
198. Id. at 253.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 254.
201. See id.
202. Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 254.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 255.
205. Id.
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emission characteristics is as much an ‘attempt to enforce’ a ‘standard’ as a
command, accompanied by sanctions, that a certain percentage of a
manufacturer’s sales volume must consist of such vehicles.”206
Justice Souter, the only dissenting justice, authored an opinion challenging
the majority for failing to recognize the presumption against preemption, as
well as the legislative history and purpose behind the CAA.207 He began by
articulating the practical consequence of the Court’s holding, noting that it
“prohibits one of the most polluted regions in the United States from requiring
private fleet operators to buy clean engines that are readily available on the
commercial market.”208 Justice Souter further questioned the majority for not
adhering to the presumption that where Congress legislates in a field
traditionally occupied by the states, a federal act can supersede the state’s
historic police powers only by demonstrating clear and manifest congressional
purpose to do so.209 He thus argued that the presumption should be applied,
given the CAA’s recognition that “the prevention and control of air pollution at
its source is the primary responsibility of States and local governments.”210
Justice Souter similarly found that the legislative history behind the
preemption provision demonstrated that Congress’s purpose was to stop states
from imposing regulatory requirements directly limiting what manufacturers
could sell.211 In light of such purpose, section 209(a) had no preemptive
application to the fleet rules.212 Further, while recognizing that a law
prohibiting any purchase of any vehicle failing to meet new state-specific
emissions criteria would have the same effect as direct manufacturer
regulation—and would thus be preempted under section 209(a)—Justice
Souter found that such was not the case here given that the fleet rules required
purchase of cleaner engines only if they were already commercially
available.213
Reaction to the Engine Manufacturers decision painted the case as
internally inconsistent and as a departure from traditional methods of statutory

206. Id.
207. Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 259–66 (Souter, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 259.
209. Id. at 260 (citing Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)).
210. Id. at 260 n.2 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2000)).
211. Id. at 261 (“Congress was not responding to concerns about varying regional appetites
for whatever vehicle models the manufacturers did produce; it was addressing the industry’s fear
that States would bar manufacturers from selling engines that failed to meet specifications that
might be different in each State.”).
212. Engine Mfrs., 541 U.S. at 262 (Souter, J., dissenting) (arguing that the “standards”
preempted under 209(a) are production mandates place on manufacturers directly as a condition
of sale and that 209(a) does not reach regulations that govern buyer’s choice between
commercially available options).
213. Id. at 262–63.
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interpretation.214 Indeed, by finding the plain meaning of “standard”
unambiguous—and thus categorically preemptive—the Court in effect
invalidated fleet rules that were otherwise in agreement with the purpose of the
CAA’s section 209(a) preemption provision, and in harmony with the primary
goal behind the CAA.215
B.

Squaring Engine Manufacturers with Massachusetts

Comparing Justice Scalia’s Engine Manufacturers decision with the
majority decision in Massachusetts illustrates not only an interpretive analysis
more consistent with the underlying purpose of the CAA, but further shows
how a majority of the Court has shifted toward a more thorough statutory
analysis (and incidentally a more hospitable view toward environmental
preemption questions). While not addressing the question of preemption,
Massachusetts did require the Court to examine the statutory text of the CAA
to determine whether the EPA had authority under the Act to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions from automobiles.216 The language at issue provided that:
[T]he EPA administrator shall by regulation prescribe . . . standards applicable
to the emission of any air pollutant from any class or classes of new motor
vehicles . . . which in his judgment cause, or contribute to, air pollution which
217
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. . . .

As stated above, the Court found initial support for a broad view of the
EPA’s authority in the CAA’s expansive definition of “any air pollutant.”218
Significantly, though, the Court went further than the statutory text in
challenging the EPA’s position that post-enactment congressional actions
functioned as tantamount to congressional commands to refrain from
That later Congresses abstained from enacting binding
regulation.219
emissions limitations to address global warming did nothing to inform
congressional intent regarding the CAA amendments.220 Instead, the Court
found that various congressional efforts to promote inter-agency climate
change collaboration and research supported and complemented the textual
mandate to regulate “any air pollutant” determined to endanger public
welfare.221

214. See Michael Gadeberg, Presumptuous Preemption: How “Plain Meaning” Trumped
Congressional Intent in Engine Manufacturers Association v. South Coast Air Quality
Management District, 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 453, 474 (2005).
215. Id. at 478.
216. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007).
217. Id. at 506.
218. See supra Section V.A.
219. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 529.
220. Id. at 529–30.
221. Id. at 530.
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In analyzing the EPA’s argument that regulation of automobile emissions
would require it to encroach on the DOT’s statutory mandate, the Court
likewise looked beyond the text of section 202(a)(1) to the underlying purpose
behind the CAA.222 Finding that the CAA charged the EPA with protecting
the public health and welfare, the Court concluded that overlap in the DOT’s
mandate in no way licensed the EPA to “shirk its environmental
responsibilities.”223 Examination of congressional history likewise aided the
conclusion that “[w]hile the Congresses that drafted §202(a)(1) might not have
appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to global
warming, they did understand that without regulatory flexibility, changing
circumstances and scientific developments would soon render the CAA
obsolete.”224
Justice Scalia’s dissent in Massachusetts further demonstrates the way in
which the majority has shifted away from the Engine Manufacturers plain
meaning construction toward an inquiry utilizing legislative history and
congressional purpose. Addressing the EPA’s authority, Justice Scalia takes
issue with the majority’s determination that carbon dioxide qualifies as an “air
pollutant” under section 202(a)(1).225 While agreeing that greenhouse gases fit
within the second half of the CAA definition, he disagrees with the majority
for failing to acknowledge the first half of the definition, requiring it first be an
“air pollution agent or combination of such agents.”226 The EPA instead
argued that a substance “does not meet the CAA definition of air pollutant
simply because it is a physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is
emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air. It must also be an air
pollution agent.”227 On this equally plausible statutory reading, Justice Scalia
urged application of Chevron deference to the EPA in light of this textual
ambiguity, and criticized the majority for failing to explain why such deference
was not due.228
Further, Justice Scalia looked to Webster’s New International Dictionary
for confirmation that the EPA’s interpretation of “air pollution” was
reasonable.229 There he found “pollute” defined as “[t]o make or render
impure or unclean,” and “air” defined as: (1) “[t]he invisible, odorless, and
tasteless mixture of gases which surrounds the earth”; (2) “[t]he body of the

222. Id. at 532.
223. Id.
224. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 532.
225. Id. at 555 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
226. Id. at 556.
227. Id. at 557–58 (internal citations omitted).
228. Id. at 558 (“[O]nce again, in the fact of textual ambiguity, the Court’s application of
Chevron deference to EPA’s interpretation of the word ‘including’ is nowhere to be found.
Evidently, the Court defers only to those reasonable interpretations it favors.”).
229. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 559, (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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earth’s atmosphere; esp., the part of it near the earth, as distinguished from the
upper rarefied part”; (3) “[a] portion of air or of the air considered with respect
to physical characteristics or as affecting the senses.”230 Given this definition,
Justice Scalia found the EPA’s interpretation of air pollution to include
impurities in the ambient air “at ground level or near the surface of the earth”
entirely consistent with the terms natural meaning.231 As in Engine
Manufacturers, Justice Scalia’s analysis saw no need to move beyond the plain
language of section 202(a)(1), and offered no examination of the legislative
history surrounding the CAA provision. Justice Stevens addressed this
criticism in the majority opinion, when he stated that:
Justice Scalia maintains that because greenhouse gases permeate the world’s
atmosphere rather than a limited area near the earth’s surface, [the] EPA’s
exclusion of greenhouse gases from the category of air pollution “agent[s]” is
entitled to deference under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc. . . . [The] EPA’s distinction, however, finds no support in the
text of the statute, which uses the phrase “the ambient air” without
distinguishing between atmospheric layers. Moreover, it is a plainly
unreasonable reading of a sweeping statutory provision designed to capture
any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter which is emitted into or
otherwise enters the ambient air. Justice Scalia does not (and cannot) explain
why Congress would define “air pollutant” so carefully and so broadly, yet
confer on [the] EPA the authority to narrow that definition whenever expedient
by asserting that a particular substance is not an “agent.” At any rate, no party
to this dispute contests that greenhouse gases both “ente[r] the ambient air”
and tend to warm the atmosphere. They are therefore unquestionably
232
“agent[s]” of air pollution.

Seemingly then, Justice Scalia’s failure to look beyond the plain meaning
of statutory language in Massachusetts, as in Engine Manufacturers, resulted
again in an outcome at odds with the primary purpose behind the CAA.233 Of
importance for current discussion, however, is the fact that while Justice
Scalia’s Engine Manufacturers decision was on behalf of a majority of eight
justices, his dissent in Massachusetts now only garners the support of his three
most conservative colleagues.
Indeed, Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Engine Manufacturers
articulates the interpretive analysis that Justice Stevens’ majority opinion
employs in Massachusetts. In challenging the majority’s preemption holding

230. Id. (citing WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1910 (2d ed. 1949)).
231. Id. at 560.
232. Id. at 529 n.26 (internal citations omitted).
233. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1) (2000) (stating that the CAA was drafted with the purpose of
protecting and enhancing the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public
health and welfare as well as the productive capacity of its population.). See Gadeberg, supra
note 214, at 478.
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in Engine Manufacturers, Justice Souter looked beyond the plain language of
section 209(a) to find that the presumption against preemption was evident
from CAA section 101 language stating that “air pollution control at its source
is the primary responsibility of the States and local governments.”234
Furthermore, where the majority stopped at the plain meaning of
“standard” viewed in light of a dictionary definition, Justice Souter examined
legislative history to determine that Congress’s purpose in passing the
preemption provision was meant only to stop state attempts at imposing
regulatory requirements that directly limited what manufacturers were able to
sell.235
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial resolution of the statutory conflict between the CAA and EPCA
will have great importance in the coming years as more and more states
continue to recognize the significant dilemma that climate change poses
globally, and as they seek to take an active role in limiting their own GHG
emissions. The Supreme Court decision in Massachusetts seems to indicate a
shift in the Court’s view regarding environmental regulatory preemption, a
new judicial awareness of the real threat global warming poses, a more
thorough statutory analysis, and likely a more hospitable outcome for CARB
and other state litigants seeking to defend their regulatory attempts against
industry preemption challenges. While it remains unclear whether the Court
will employ the presumption against preemption in future litigation, the
Massachusetts Court’s endorsement of piecemeal regulatory efforts to combat
global warming, coupled with the thorough justification for non-conflicting
overlap provided by Green Mountain Chrysler and Central Valley, present a
persuasive foundation for the Court to side with states’ rights.
*AUTHOR’S NOTE
Since the writing of this note the EPA has, for the first time, denied
outright California’s waiver request to regulate GHG automobile emissions.236
The EPA administrator Stephen Johnson maintains that an energy bill recently
signed by President Bush represents a “clear national solution” more preferable
than the “confusing patchwork of state rules” he alleges the current regulatory
system provides.237 As of January 2, 2008, California has brought suit against

234. Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Quality Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260 (2004) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 261–62 (discussing hearings leading up to 1967 amendments, where Congress was
addressing the automobile industry’s fears that different States would bar manufacturers from
selling engines that failed to meet specifications that could be different in each state).
236. Simon & Wilson, supra note 9, at 1.
237. Id.
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the EPA, challenging the agency’s waiver denial.238 California maintains that
the agency “had no legal or technical justification for blocking the new
standards.”239 This latest development typifies the tempestuous relationship
between an administration obstinate about federal regulatory control and those
states pushing for more responsible greenhouse gas regulation.
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